In this paper we i n troduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation CWS model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang 1996 in which the World is partitioned into six regions. We rst state the necessary conditions that determine Pareto e cient i n vestment and emission abatement paths under alternative regimes of cooperation between the regions. We then test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic core" property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997 holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries i.e. coalitions, should have a n i n terest in leaving the e cient international environmental agreement. For the numerical speci cation of the CWS model used here, we obtain the result that this is indeed the case. Further coalitional analysis by means of the model allows us to evaluate some alternative post-Kyoto policies.
Introduction and Summary
International environmental agreements involving substantial emission reduction e orts are unlikely to be reached without provisions for international transfers. The reason is that, although there generally is a substantial surplus to be gained from cooperation, there are most often countries for which the abatement e ort required by the world optimum is so large that they end up worse o under this world optimum compared to the non-cooperative laissez-faire situation. That international transfers can compensate for such undesirable outcome was argued quite long ago e.g. Tulkens, 1979 and taken up again more recently, albeit with some scepticism, by Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 or Barrett 1994 . This paper investigates how such i n ternational transfers might look like in the case of the global climate change problem. In particular we employ the transfer scheme proposed by Tulkens 1995 and 1997 in a static context and Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997 in a dynamic context. This transfer rule redistributes the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation in proportion to the marginal climate change damage costs that countries experience. Proportionality w.r.t. damages is a feature of many strategic transfer scheme like for instance in Eyckmans 1997 . Chander and Tulkens 1995 have shown that their proportional transfer scheme results in an allocation in the core of the emission abatement game when damage costs are a linear function of the pollution stock. The core property is a necessary but not su cient condition for full, voluntary cooperation among the countries involved in the transboundary pollution problem as explained in Tulkens 1998 . If it were not satis ed, there might exist coalitions that could obtain a better outcome by coordinating their emission strategies among themselves. Such coalitions would have no incentive to join an international environmental treaty. Since for the climate change problem the linearity assumption for damage functions is hard to maintain and while no analytical results are available for the nonlinear case, we h a ve t o turn to an empirical model to test the core property of the transfer mechanism proposed in Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997 . For this purpose we i n troduce in section 2 the CLIMNEG World Simulation CWS model which w e derived from the seminal economyclimate model RICE of Nordhaus and Yang 1996 . Like RICE, the CWS model is an optimal growth model for the world economy, coupled to a basic representation of the carbon cycle and climate system. The main di erences between RICE and CWS are that we w ork with a model in which utilities are linear in consumption and that we do not consider international trade ows. Both of these modi cations are made in order to focus on the game theoretic aspects of the cooperation problem. In section 3 we describe di erent scenarios w.r.t. cooperation in the CWS model. Complete absence of cooperation is modeled in section 3.1 as an open loop 1 Nash equilibrium of 1 Closed loop Nash equilibria are considered in Germain, Toint, Tulkens and De Zeeuw 1998, in terms 4 carbon emissions. In such an equilibrium every region reduces its emissions to equalize its discounted marginal abatement cost to the sum of its own future discounted marginal damages from climate change. Positive externalities to other countries are ignored. Also the Ramsey-Keynes rule driving the intertemporal allocation of investment and consumption only internalizes a region's private marginal climate change damages and disregards spillovers to neighbouring countries. Pareto e cient allocations are characterized in section 3.2. In such allocations, the rule determining emission abatement e orts is shown to be a dynamic version of the Samuelson 1954 rule for the optimal provision of public goods. Every region should reduce its carbon emissions up to the point where its discounted marginal abatement costs are equal to the sum of all regions' future discounted marginal damages from climate change. Spillover e ects are completely internalized. Similarly, capital accumulation is determined by a generalization of the Keynes-Ramsey rule and internalizes completely carbon emission externalities to all other regions of the world. In section 3.3, we de ne partial agreement Nash equilibria with respect to a coalition which i s the counterpart for dynamic models of a concept introduced by Tulkens 1995 and 1997 . This equilibrium concept assumes that a coalition of countries chooses investment and emissions levels that maximize the coalition's joint p a yo for a given investment and emission strategy of the outsiders, non-members of the coalition. The outsiders on their turn maximize their individual payo taking as given the strategies of all other players. Optimality rules driving investment and emission abatement decisions in a partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. a coalition turn out to be a combination of the optimality rules for the Pareto e cient allocations and the standard open loop Nash equilibrium. In section 4 the partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. a coalition concept is used to de ne the core of a carbon emission abatement cooperative game. Core allocations satisfy both individual and coalition participation constraints, i.e. these allocations are such that no individual country, nor any coalition of countries, can gain by returning to its partial agreement Nash equilibrium. Simulations with the numerical CWS model are reported in section 5. We rst construct three reference scenarios business-as-usual, Nash equilibrium and Pareto e cient allocation without transfers and we compare them in terms of carbon emissions, carbon concentrations, temperature change and emission abatement e ort. Since we use a lower discount rate and a higher exponent of the climate change damage functions we obtain higher emission abatement gures, hence smaller temperature changes and a higher surplus of cooperation than in the original formulation of the RICE model in Nordhaus and Yang 1996. In order to check for the core property in the numerical CWS model, we computed all possible partial agreement Nash equilibria w.r.t. any coalition and compared each cothat cannot be applied as yet to the present CWS model. alition's payo to its joint allocation of consumption under the Pareto e cient solution without transfer. We observe in the simulations that the core property is violated, both for China as an individual region, and for some intermediate coalitions containing China. We then consider whether the participation problem raised thereby can be overcome by using the Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997 international transfer scheme. It turns out that all coalitions are better o under the transfer scheme than under their respective partial agreement Nash equilibrium. Hence, the transfer solution belongs to the core of this game and can be sustained as a voluntary agreement.
2 CWS, an integrated climate-economy w orld model
Statement of the model
In this section we i n troduce an integrated economy-climate world model. It will be used i for deriving rst-order necessary conditions that characterise various scenarios and ii for illustrating the transfer formula to sustain cooperative agreements. Each national economy is represented by a discrete time optimal growth model with a long but nite horizon. N denotes the set of countries regions 2 indexed i = 1 ; 2; : : :; n . Growth is driven by exogenous population growth, technological change and endogenous capital accumulation. The following equations describe the economy of region i at time t: Y i;t = Z i;t + I i;t + C i i;t + D i T t 1 Y i;t = A i;t F i K i;t 2 K i;t+1 = 1 , K K i;t + I i;t ; K i;0 given 3 Equation 1 de nes the claims of consumption Z i;t , i n vestment I i;t , cost of abatement C i i;t and climate change damage D i T t upon production Y i;t . The costs of abatement and climate change damages are assumed strictly increasing and strictly convex in abatement i;t and temperature change T t respectively. 2 de nes production as a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of capital input K i;t . A i;t measures overall productivity. It is assumed that productivity increases exogenously as time goes by and technological progress is Hicks neutral. Labour supply, assumed to be an exogenous input in production, is subsumed in the functional form of the productivity measure A i;t . According to expression 4, carbon emissions E i;t are proportional to production. The emissions to output ratio i;t declines exogenously over time due to an assumed autonomous energy e ciency increase AEEI. Emissions can be reduced at a rate i;t 2 0; 1 in every period though this is costly according to equation 1. Equation 5 describes the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere. This process is modelled similarly to a standard capital accumulation process where M denotes the natural decay rate of atmospheric carbon concentrations and is the airborne fraction of carbon emissions. Expression 6 translates atmospheric carbon concentration levels into global mean temperature change 3 . W e assume that G is a continuous di erentiable and increasing function. For the purpose of this section, there is no need to make the function G more explicit. In the numerical simulation model CWS, we will adopt exactly the same formulation as in RICE for the carbon cycle and temperature change equations. It should be noted that the RICE formulation satis es the general properties we assume for G. Finally, the welfare of each country i is measured by its aggregate lifetime discounted consumption:
where i stands for the discount rate of region i and the strictly increasing and strictly concave function w i stands for the scrap value of the terminal capital stock K i;T+1 .
Di erences with the RICE model
Conceptually, the model outlined above i s v ery similar to the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang 1996 . In this section we clarify and motivate the di erences that our formu-lation introduces. First, we do not allow for international trade in consumption. Trade complicates the analysis considerably because it creates, besides the climate change externality, additional interdependencies between the regions that we w ant t o a void in order to better concentrate on the cooperation issues raised by the environmental externality. In addition, we feel that the way Nordhaus and Yang 1996 introduce trade in RICE is not fully satisfactory. In their Negishi solution, the exports of the consumption good can be interpreted as some kind of restricted normative transfers among the regions whose justi cation is not clear. Finally, since the magnitude of actual net exports exports minus imports is relatively small , we feel that not much is lost from leaving out international trade. Secondly, w e use an additive instead of a multiplicative formulation of the feedback of emission abatement costs and climate change damages on consumption possibilities. Conceptually, the two formulations re ect costs of emission abatement and of damages from climate change that reduce the amount of production devoted to consumption or investment. The di erence lies in the fact that Nordhaus and Yang 1996 allow for cross e ects between emission abatement costs and climate change damages: this type of cross e ects are excluded by our formulation. Thirdly, i n c o n trast to Nordhaus and Yang 1996, we assume that utilities are linear in consumption. W e make this simpli cation in order to represent the global carbon emission game as a transferable utility TU game. For our purpose of game theoretic stability analysis and numerical simulations of potential climate change agreements, a TU framework is better suited than a non-TU game. In particular, for the cooperative solution concept of the core, one cannot use the concept of the value function of a coalition on which our present computations rest. Fourthly, the CWS model allows for di erent regional discount rates. We feel that the huge di erences between world regions in terms of economic development and openness to nancial markets do not justify that a uniform discount rate be applied in all regions, as is the case in RICE. In our simulations we h a ve c hosen systematically higher discount rates for developing regions than for industrialized countries. A Nash equilibrium is a solution to this system of rst-order conditions, holding for all i 2 N and for each 0 t T. Condition 9 says that for every region i and in every period t the shadow cost of capital equals the shadow cost of the resource constraint and that both are equal to the discount factor of region i. The evolution of the capital stock is described by conditions 10 and 11. 12 determines the optimal amount of carbon emissions control for country i. Expression 13 describes the evolution of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the atmospheric carbon concentration equation. In economic terms, this multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow price o f c arbon concentration. By using the terminal condition NE i;T = 0 for solving iteratively the di erence equation 13, it appears that the shadow price of carbon for region i in period t is equal to the sum of all its future marginal damages caused by an additional unit of carbon emissions at time t:
Notice that, since 14 holds for each region i separately, the shadow price of atmospheric carbon concentration at a Nash equilibrium only takes into account the climate change damage occurring within a region's territory. Spillover e ects to neighbouring regions are not taken into account in the region's individual decision process. Substituting 14 for the shadow price in 12, we derive a rule determining the optimal amount of carbon emission control at a Nash equilibrium that reads as follows:
The left hand side LHS stands for the discounted marginal cost for region i of reducing its carbon emissions by an additional ton in period t. The denominator denotes gross emissions without abatement and is used to convert the units of the marginal abatement costs into US$ per ton of carbon 4 . 15 is the traditional optimality condition for a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, s a ying that marginal abatement costs should be equal to individual marginal damage of climate change.
We n o w turn to the Ramsey-Keynes condition that drives capital accumulation for country i. Substituting 9 into 11, the latter condition can be written as follows:
This condition says that along an optimal investment path, region i should be indi erent between consuming an additional $ at time t,1 and postponing consumption for investing in next period's capital stock. The Ramsey-Keynes rule for the Nash equilibrium only internalizes climate change damage occurring domestically since negative climate change externalities to neighbouring countries are not taken into account in the shadow price of carbon NE i;t .
It is interesting to notice that if a region does not value climate change damages D 0 i x = 0 8x 0, the Ramsey-Keynes rule boils down to simply: i + K = A i;t F 0 i K i;t . This is the golden rule of capital accumulation saying that along an optimal investment path, the net marginal product of capital should be equal to the pure rate of time preference. The fact that there is a production externality causing detrimental climate change in the climate-economy model de ates the marginal return of capital by a factor that depends upon the shadow price of carbon.
World Pareto e ciency
Since the individual utility functions W i are assumed linear in consumption, Pareto e cient investment and emission abatement paths can be derived from maximizing an unweighted sum of all the regions' utilities: The interpretation of these rst-order conditions runs very similar to the Nash equilibrium case. Substituting for the Pareto e cient shadow price of carbon t in 21, we derive the rule determining the Pareto e cient amount of carbon emission control for country i in period t The Pareto e cient shadow price of carbon is calculated in the same way a s before through iterative substitution from 22:
Notice that the Pareto e cient shadow price of carbon now takes into account the climate change damage a ecting all regions in the world. Thus, in contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the climate externality i s i n ternalized. Rule 23 will be referred to in the sequel as the Samuelson rule for the Pareto e cient provision of emission reduction. It is a dynamic extension of the traditional optimality rule for static public good models that was rst stated by Samuelson 1954 . The left hand side LHS of the expression stands for the discounted marginal cost for region i of reducing its carbon emissions by an additional ton in period t. The RHS consists of the sum from period t + 1 u n til the nal period T of all regions' discounted future marginal damages from climate change times the airborne fraction . Notice that the Samuelson rule 23 does not say that all regions should reduce their emissions in such a w ay that their discounted marginal abatement costs in each period t be equalized. This would be the case only if all countries had the same discount rate i = .
Our Samuelson rule is therefore a weighted extension of the traditional optimality rule for the provision of public goods. Countries characterized by a high discount rate are required to perform relatively more emission abatement since their opportunity cost of an additional $ of consumption is lower. For a more precise treatment of this argument and the trade o between equity and e ciency, see, e.g., Eyckmans, Proost and Schokkaert 1993. We n o w derive the condition for the optimal accumulation of capital in the presence of an environmental externality. Substituting 18 into 20 and rewriting, we obtain:
Though this condition looks exactly the same as condition 16, it is fundamentally di erent since in the Pareto e cient case, the shadow price of carbon t internalizes all climate change externalities whereas it only internalizes domestic damages in the Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Partial agreement Nash equilibria w.r.t. a coalition The previous two sections described two extreme cases as to cooperation. In a Pareto e cient scenario, all regions take action jointly to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and they do so by i n ternalizing completely the external e ects of their carbon emissions. In the Nash equilibrium, e v ery region reduces its carbon emissions also but to a lesser extent because they only internalize the external e ects of their emissions that a ect their own territory. I n termediate cases are conceivable, when only some subgroup of regions agrees to coordinate its emission reduction policies 5 .
In order to characterize this situation of partial cooperation, we use the concept of partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. a c oalition PANE, introduced by Tulkens 1995 and 1997 . Suppose a coalition S N forms with s members. In a partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. coalition S, this coalition chooses actions that are most bene cial from the group's point of view while the outsiders to the coalition choose actions that maximize their individual utility. The PANE w.r.t. S can be interpreted as a special type of Nash equilibrium in which a coalition S coordinates its policies taking as given the emission strategies of the outsiders who, in turn, are playing a non-cooperative Nash strategy against S. F ormally, a partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. coalition S is a combination of strategies that solves simultaneously the following n , s + 1 maximization problems:
for the insiders i 2 S : 4 Transfers ensuring individual and coalititional rationality 4.1 Individual and coalitional rationality
As is well known, the fact that a particular allocation is Pareto e cient does not imply that all regions are better o compared to a Nash equilibrium. While many regions are net winners, some other regions may be net losers. And if a region is worse o , it will not accept an agreement that proposes to implement such an allocation. In this case we will say that the proposed agreement does not satisfy individual rationality. Not only individual regions may b e w orse o under the Pareto e cient solution: also coalitions of two or more regions may nd out that they can do better if the joint p a yo of their members in the partial agreement Nash equilibrium is higher than at the e cient allocation. If this is the case, we s a y that the e cient allocation does not satisfy coalitional rationality.
Allocations that satisfy both individual rationality for all regions, and coalitional rationality for all possible coalitions of the regions are said to belong to the core" of a cooperative game associated with the economic model under consideration. In the present case of the CWS model, the players of the game are the regions, and the players' strategies are the emission abatement policies chosen by the regions. In this setting, the core property o f an allocation thus ensures that no coalition S could be better o by proposing a partial agreement Nash equilibrium w.r.t. itself. This property can be interpreted as a necessary though not su cient condition for a voluntary international agreement to be sustained, as argued in Tulkens 1998.
The transfers formula
These considerations imply that a climate treaty implementing the Pareto e cient allocation prescribed by the Samuelson rule 23 may not emerge as a voluntary agreement among the emitters of carbon dioxide. However, transfers of consumption o er a way t o induce such v oluntary cooperation. In particular, we consider in this paper the transfer scheme proposed by Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997 for stock pollution problems. In this section we present a reinterpretation of this transfer scheme for the CWS model. We start from a Pareto e cient allocation of emission abatement e orts that solves the However, contrary to Nordhaus and Yang 1996, we select di erent parameter values on two crucial points. First, we c hoose a discount rate of 1.5 for the industrialized regions USA, JPN, EU and FSU and a higher discount rate of 3 for the developing regions CHN and ROW. This di erence re ects taste di erences across regions concerning the priority of economic development o ver environmental concern. Secondly, w e increase the value of the exponent in the climate change damage function 35 from 1.5 to 2.5. This choice was made after learning from our colleagues climatologists that temperature changes of 7 Celsius or more are to be considered as catastrophic ones: indeed, this di erence is larger than the change in temperature between the last Ice Age and current temperature.
Finally, w e also revised downward the projected exogenous technology growth for FSU in order to match more closely current predictions on economic production for this region.
Computing equilibria
In order to calculate partial agreement Nash equilibria w.r.t. coalitions including plain Nash equilibria, we use a standard numerical algorithm to compute non-cooperative Nash equilibria where the coalition S is treated as one player in the emission game. In every iteration, a strategy is determined for each player, consisting of an investment and emission abatement path that maximizes its life time utility given the strategies of the other players. This iteration process is continued until the Euclidean distance between the strategy vectors in two consecutive iterations is smaller than a given threshold value. As perfect information is assumed, the resulting equilibrium is an open loop equilibrium. The algorithm is equivalent to the one used by Y ang 1998 to calculate numerically so-called hybrid" coalition solutions. It was implemented using the optimization software GAMS. With 32 periods decades, solving for one partial agreement Nash equilibrium only takes a couple of minutes on a Pentium II, 300mhz PC 6 . Theoretically, a su cient condition for convergence of this kind of algorithm is that the absolute value of the slope of the reaction functions of all players be smaller than one. In that case, the reaction mapping is a contraction and convergence is assured. In the CWS model and in RICE this condition on the slope of the reaction functions is not easy to check because of the dynamic speci cation of the carbon cycle and climate change model. In practice however, we never encountered any convergence problem during the numerous simulations. We never found multiple equilibria by c hanging the set of starting values.
Reference simulations: BAU, NASH, EFF
5.3.1 Carbon emissions Figure 1 shows annual world carbon emissions in three scenarios: business-as-usual BAU, Nash equilibrium NASH and Pareto e ciency without transfers EFF 7 . W e only consider carbon emissions originating from fossil fuel use. World carbon emissions in 1990 amount to approximately 6 gigatons 8 of carbon.
In the BAU scenario, we assume that countries do not value climate change and do nothing to restrict their carbon emissions, i.e. i;t = 0 for all i and t. BAU emissions grow continuously to reach nearly 40 GtC by the year 2100 and more than 62 GtC in 2200. BAU emissions continue to grow throughout the entire time horizon although the pace of growth gradually slows down. In the NASH equilibrium scenario, emissions grow at a slightly slower rate to reach about 38 GtC by the year 2100 and 58 GtC by 2200. Also in NASH, emissions continue to grow though growth decelerates. Pareto e cient carbon emissions EFF are substantially lower than BAU and NASH emissions: by the year 2100 they amount to some 24 GtC, and only 21 GtC by 2200. This is about half the BAU emission level in 2100 and almost one third of BAU emissions in 2200. In contrast to BAU and NASH emissions, the EFF emission path rises until 2150, levels o at about 26 GtC and decreases afterwards. Figure 2 shows the atmospheric carbon concentration in the BAU, NASH equilibrium and EFF scenarios respectively. 1990 atmospheric carbon concentration amounted approximately 750 GtC. Under BAU, the atmospheric carbon concentration rises steadily and reaches about 1718 GtC in 2100 and 3443 GtC in 2200. Doubling of the concentration w.r.t. 1990 takes place between 2080 and 2090. The NASH carbon concentration path follows closely the BAU path and continues to grow steadily all over the time horizon. By contrast, in the EFF scenario, atmospheric carbon concentrations grow a t a m uch slower rate and reach 1279 GtC in 2100 and 2012 GtC in 2200. Doubling of the atmospheric carbon concentration w.r.t. 1990 is postponed until somewhere between 2110 and 2120. The carbon concentration levels o at about 1900 GtC by the year 2200. In that respect, the Pareto e cient outcome can be considered more sustainable than the BAU and NASH scenarios. Figure 3 shows the temperature increase compared to preindustrial times for the three reference scenarios. By the year 2100 temperature rises with 2.77, 2.69 and 2.24 Celsius in the BAU, NASH and EFF scenarios respectively. By the year 2200, di erences are more pronounced: 5.42, 5.26 and 3.92 Celsius. Whereas BAU and NASH temperatures continue to rise steadily, the Pareto e cient temperature change levels o at about 4 Celsius by the end of the time horizon shown in Figure 3 . This occurs only about 50 years after the atmospheric carbon concentration has leveled o because of the long time inertia of the climate system. Figure 4 shows the time path of emissions control NE i;t for the NASH equilibrium. There are substantial di erences across regions. Taking averages of abatement e ort over time, we see that CHN produces the highest abatement level about 11.28, followed by EU with 10.69 and USA with 9.48. The lowest abatement e ort is by ROW with only 2.14. World average abatement amounts to 5.42. The time path of emissions control rate of ROW lies far below the paths of the other regions due to strong free riding incentives within this heterogeneous region 9 . CHN and EU are situated at the other end of the spectrum. For CHN this is due to the combination of low emission abatement costs and substantial climate change damages. For EU this is due to their relatively high climate change damage valuation. Finally, Figure 5 shows the time path of emission control rates i;t for the Pareto e cient scenario EFF. Average world emission abatement w.r.t. BAU emissions rises from 5.42 in BAU to about 44.32 in EFF. In EFF, both CHN and ROW should reduce their emissions substantially more than the others regions 72.11 and 58.78 respectively and, more strikingly, their abatement e ort rises over time. This last fact is due to the higher discount rates of CHN and ROW. Since they value the future less than the other regions, they are asked to perform ever more e ort as time goes by. For them, the opportunity cost of forgoing an additional $ of consumption is valued less than for industrialized regions, cfr. formula 23. Figure 6 shows the evolution of aggregate world consumption undiscounted gures and normalized such that 1990 equals 1 under di erent scenarios. It shows clearly the unsustainable character of both the BAU and NASH scenarios because long term consumption prospects are declining after 2200 as a result of the ever increasing damages from climate change. The EFF scenario however provides su cient carbon emission control such that long term consumption opportunities do not decline over time. Figure 7 shows the di erences in world consumption levels, at each point in time t, b e t ween the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the Pareto e cient scenarios: evolution over time of the value of cooperation over noncooperation. Typically, u p t o t h e year 2080, the NASH scenario dominates the e cient scenario EFF. After 2090 however, the order of dominance is reversed. In total, the sum over time of all di erences the surface under the curve is positive as the gains from cooperation in the far future more than compensate for the initial losses. However, the fact that the expected break even date lies very far in the future makes current cooperation on restricting greenhouse gases much more di cult. Table 1 summarizes total discounted consumption over the entire horizon of the computation, i.e. 320 years for the di erent regions under the di erent cooperation scenarios. The last row world reveals the overall magnitudes at stake. Discounted consumption amounts to 335,393, 336,173 and 339,460 billion $ respectively. The gain at the world level between the BAU and NASH equilibrium is rather small+0.23, the additional gain obtained by moving from NASH to the Pareto e cient allocation EFF is more important +0.98. Overall, the welfare gain of moving from BAU to the e cient scenario is about 1.21.
Atmospheric carbon concentrations

Temperature changes
Emission control rates
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How do these gures relate to the original RICE model as reported in Table 4 , p.757 in Nordhaus and Yang 1996? The overall di erence is much larger in our calculations than in RICE. The di erence between BAU and EFF amounts to 4067 billion $ against only 344 billion $ in Nordhaus and Yang 1996. However, it is not meaningful to compare world consumption di erences since we are using di erent discount rates and a di erent time horizon 320 years. In particular, we use 1.5 for industrialized regions and 3.0 for developing regions whereas Nordhaus and Yang 1996 use region speci c discount rates on consumption : : :that average about 4.5 per year p.755, italics added. Clearly, through our choice of discount rates we v alue climate change damages avoided in the far future much heavier than Nordhaus and Yang 1996. Moreover, we use a more convex damage function such that overall our value of cooperation must be considerably higher than the one calculated by RICE. The most striking di erence is the pattern of winners and losers in the EFF scenario compared to NASH. Whereas Nordhaus and Yang 1996 nd that USA is the only loser, we nd that only CHN would lose from joining an e cient agreement without transfers. Again, it is di cult to compare this pattern with RICE since we h a ve no trade in our cooperative solution. Unfortunately, Nordhaus and Yang 1996 did not report the trade ows in their e cient Negishi solution so we cannot judge whether the di erence in the pattern of winners and losers is due to the absence of trade ows in our model. Though there is only an increase of total world consumption of about 1 between NASH and EFF, emission abatement policies do di er substantially between both scenarios as it appears from Figures 4 and 5 . Similarly, Figure 3 shows importantly smaller temperature changes under EFF than under both BAU and NASH. Thus, while internationally coordinated policies appear to be importantly di erent from uncoordinated ones as far as environmental variables are concerned, the present model reveals that there may be some economic indi erence between them 10 . 5.5 Checking the core property of the Pareto e cient scenario without transfers
Concerning individual rationality, w e observe from Table 1 that China is the only region experiencing a loss in lifetime consumption from moving from the Nash equilibrium to the e cient solution. It loses about 207 million US$ or 2.28. This is not surprising for a region with relatively low marginal emission reduction costs and or relatively low marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality. From a global point of view, it might be desirable to require a substantial contribution from low cost regions in the global emission abatement e ort. However the value of the avoided climate change damage might be insu cient for these regions to compensate for such an increase in their abatement e ort. In order to check for coalitional rationality, i.e. whether there exist groups of regions that would bene t more from forming a coalition of their own than from the Pareto e cient allocation, we calculated all possible partial agreement Nash equilibria for the CWS model. The number of all possible coalitions is given by 2 N = 64 for 6 regions. A complete list of all coalition values and their payo s Z S S is given in Table 2 . The entries in Table 2 have been sorted out in increasing order of coalition size. The rst six lines refer to the payo of the individual countries in the Nash equilibrium. The next 15 lines refer to all pairs, the next 20 lines to coalitions of size three and so on. The last line refers the Pareto e cient allocation where S = N. P ayo gures are reported in billion 1990US$. The rst column contains a six digit key from which the structure of the coalition can be deducted. If a region is a member of the coalition, it obtains a 1" at the appropriate position in the key. For instance, the key 100000" refers to S = fUSAg, 010000" refers to S = fJPNg, 001000" refers to S = fEUg, 000100" refers to S = fCHNg, 000010" refers to S = fFS U g, 000001" refers to S = fROWg, 111000" refers to S = fUSA;JPN;ECg, '`111111" refers to S = N and so on. If this di erence is negative, it means that S is worse o at the EFF allocation and that the voluntary participation constraint for coalition S is not satis ed.
There are indeed four coalitions with S 2 for which the voluntary participation constraint is violated. In particular some coalitions containing CHN and ROW arein this situation. In column six of Table 2 , Germain, Toint, Tulkens transfers S are reported as computed from formula 29 with shares adjusted as in 30. Column seven Z S + S contains the value of total consumption available to the coalitions after these transfers have taken place. The last two columns show the di erences Z S + S , Z S S in absolute amounts and in percentages. As the transfers i should balance, we v erify that P N i = 0 i n the last line of Table 2 . The shares of the regions in the surplus of cooperation i are as follows: USA: 20.5, JPN : 10.9, EU : 28.9, CHN : 3.0, FSU : 6.8 and ROW : 29.9. Hence, EU and ROW seize each about 30 of the surplus of cooperation. Recall that these shares re ect the di erent regions' share in total world discounted marginal climate change damages. These weights resemble closely the distribution of GDP in the reference year 1990 see Table 6 in the Appendix. Table 2 shows that the industrialized regions USA, JPN, EU and FSU p a y transfers to the developing regions CHN and ROW. In particular, the transfer scheme 29 compensates CHN such that they are better o under the Pareto e cient allocation with transfers than if there were no cooperation at all. Hence, CHN has no incentive to deviate individually anymore. Eventually, all regions are individually better o under the transfer scheme compared to the non-cooperative open loop Nash equilibrium since the di erence Z S + S , Z S S is positive for all regions. Hence, the transfer solution satis es individual rationality. It can also be seen from Table 2 that the coalitional rationality constraints are met for all possible subcoalitions S N with S 2. In particular the ve coalitions for which coalitional rationality w as violated in the Pareto e cient allocation without transfers receive su cient compensation. Hence, the allocation with Germain, Toint and Tulkens transfers is a core allocation for the emission abatement game associated to the CWS model. We h a ve run numerous simulations for di erent sets of parameters like discount rates, climate change damage parameters, free riding behaviour in region ROW etc. Details on this sensitivity analysis can be obtained from the authors. For none of these sensitivity analyses we found a violation of the core property of the transfer scheme. Of course, this is not a general proof of the core property for nonlinear damage functions but still it indicates that the result is robust.
Coalitional aspects of some post-Kyoto policies
In addition to providing a numerical proof of the core property of the e cient scenario with Germain, Toint, Tulkens transfers, Table 2 is also an instrument for evaluating policies that single countries, or coalitions of countries, might consider adopting. This is indeed what was meant b y the concept of Partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to a coalition" in section 3.3 above; it is now computed, for every possible coalition, in column 2 of Table 2 . As examples, let us single out the following three such policies, which happen to be of particular interest in the current context: that is, the aggregate payo for the Annex B coalition in terms of discounted aggregate consumption is higher than if each of its members chooses the NASH scenario this would also be the case, a fortiori, if the BAU coalition were chosen instead. Thus, although this coalition does not achieve optimality at the world level, its formation is preferable for all its members to isolated domestic actions NASH or to no action at all BAU. It is thus collectively rational for the Annex B countries to act on their own, as speci ed by the Kyoto Protocol, in spite of the fact that the rest of the world sticks to an individualistic, non cooperative actually BAU-type policy.
2. The George W. Bush" policy, where the coalition S corresponds to the line keyed as f100000g. T able 2 reveals that for this coalition, Z USA USA = 7 7 :871 Z USA + USA = 7 8 :544 Z USA = 7 8 :836
that is, sticking to a domestic optimization policy only is for the USA less benecial than the world optimal policy, both with and without transfers to ensure its cooperative stability. 
The transfers and time
The transfers as de ned by 30 and whose numerical values are reported in Table 2 above are single numbers representing the 1990 present v alue of consumption ows over 320 years.
They cannot realistically be conceived of as being paid as lump sum transfers at time t = 0 .
Can they instead be spread over time? The answer is no. Indeed, gure 6 showed the di erences in world consumption levels at each time t between the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the Pareto e cient allocation. Up to the year 2080, the non-cooperative NASH solution dominates the Pareto e cient EFF allocation. After 2080, the dominance relationship is reversed. In total, the sum of the gains after 2100 more than compensates for the initial losses. This means that we are in a situation as in Assumption 3 in Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997. Obviously, the countries cannot borrow against future gains in order to compensate for early losses. We should therefore design a transfer scheme in such a w ay that the regions most a ected initially be compensated partially by the less a ected regions. An attempt to design such a transfer scheme with transfers evolving over time is reported in Germain, Toint, Tulkens and De Zeeuw 1998 for a simpler economic-climate model. Computational complexity of this scheme requires however further research before it can be applied to the CWS model.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a ve i n troduced the CLIMNEG World Simulation model for investigating game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is inspired by the seminal paper by Nordhaus and Yang 1996. In the theoretical part of the paper rst-order necessary conditions have been derived for the allocations of consumption and abatement e ort in open loop Nash equilibria, in Pareto e cient allocations and in partial agreement Nash equilibria w.r.t. a coalition. These conditions can all be interpreted as generalizations of the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods and of the Ramsey-Keynes rule for the optimal allocation of investment across time. The bigger the cooperating coalition, the closer the partial agreement Nash equilibrium approximates the full Pareto e cient allocation. Similarly, the smaller the cooperating coalition, the closer the partial agreement Nash equilibrium approximates the traditional non-cooperative open loop Nash equilibrium. We then turned to a transfer rule that is designed to sustain full cooperation in a voluntary international environmental agreement b y making all countries at least as well o as they would be by forming coalitions that act alone and adopt emission abatement policies that maximize the coalition payo . Hence under the transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries has an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. We tested empirically with the CWS model the core property of the transfer mechanism advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens 1997. The simulations have shown that the transfer scheme gives rise to an allocation in the core of the carbon emission abatement game associated with the CWS model, even though damage functions are nonlinear.
Several problems remain open. First, the non-emptiness of the core solution with nonlinear damage functions is not established in general. This remains a priority in the cooperative game theoretical research o n v oluntary international agreements. Second, timing of the transfers is still a problem since the bene ts of cooperation are to be expected only far in the future. But further research on transfer schemes evolving over time and maintaining the core property is promising as suggested by Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw 1998. Finally, the core concept is only one facet, probably necessary but surely 
